Pakistan, Biological Weapons and the BTWC

12:22 AM // 0 comments // sb blogger // Category: Weapons //

These instruments are underpinned by a long standing moral opprobrium on ‘poison’ weapons. Such a moral opprobrium is not a purely Western centric notion. Islam prohibits the use of indiscriminate means and methods of warfare generally, and poison was specifically prohibited by the first Caliph Abu-Bakr who is understood to have “exhorted his troops to overcome their enemies by bravery and never by poison in a campaign”. The existence of a legal prohibition and a normative opprobrium necessitates that no state is likely to overtly reveal a BW programme and such accurate assessment of compliance with the BTWC based on open sources material is

fraught with difficulty. Pakistan has a developing biotechnology infrastructure located in plants such as Pakistan's National Institute for Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering (NIBGE), the Centre for Advanced Molecular Biology (CAMB) and the Nuclear Institute for Agriculture and Biology (NIAB). As with many other states, Pakistan has taken steps to show that the BTWC and the Geneva Protocol are important to the peace and security of Pakistan. Consequently, Pakistan is unlikely to have any interest in biological weapons as:

• Effective weaponisation of BW in the form of a strategically or tactically

usable weapon would be costly and difficult;

• Pakistan has nuclear weapons which are likely to be both more reliable and

militarily effective than BW;

• Pakistan’s historic adversary and primary target for its weapons, India, shares

a border with the east of Pakistan and the use of BW against India may have a

boomerang effect with catastrophic consequences for Pakistan;

As per any other state, the use of BW would be met with strong international condemnation and, at the very least, Pakistan is likely to experience sanctions. If Pakistan is going to undertake national measures that go beyond the global standard, then there needs to be incentives from those developed states pushing the non-proliferation agenda. Although Pakistan shares the concerns of Western states over bioterrorism, it is likely to be equally, if not more concerned about natural outbreaks of disease affecting health, food staples and raw materials which form part of its exports.

Pakistan is an active participant in the BTWC and, based on publicly available sources, unlikely to have active BW programmes. However, sources suggest that “terrorist” groups are functioning in the territory of Pakistan and this raises concerns over the adequacy of the implementation of national measures to prohibit and prevent BW development within Pakistani territory. Whilst Pakistan is implementing national measures to assuage concerns, more needs to be done in states on the frontline of the War on Terror. Yet, if the West is going to demand more from state with developing biotechnology infrastructures, then there needs to be incentives to do more. There are a range of areas where peaceful cooperation in the life sciences has taken place and these should be acknowledged, equally there is a need for more to be done in exchange for verified assurances on biosecurity and biosafety.